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This paper was commissioned for the Inclusion in Asset Building:  Research and Policy 
Symposium, Center for Social Development, Washington University in St. Louis, September 21-
23, 2000. 
 
The symposium was sponsored by the Ford Foundation and the George Warren Brown School of 
Social Work at Washington University.  The organizers and editors were Michael Sherraden and 
Lisa Morris. 
 
This commentary considers recent empirical research on an asset-building policy from a 
microeconomic perspective, places it in the larger context of programs that assist low income 
individuals, and suggests avenues for additional research. 
 
Individual Development Accounts (IDAs), which were developed by Michael Sherraden (1991), 
enable low-income individuals to accumulate savings for long-term goals, such as home 
ownership, post-secondary schooling, and business capitalization.  These goals are often beyond 
the reach of low-income individuals, not only because they have limited personal finances, but 
also because they often do not have adequate access to credit.  In addition to encouraging saving,  
IDAs are one means, among a number, to encourage low- income individuals who are currently 
“unbanked” to enter the mainstream financial sector (Caskey, this volume).1  Participation in the 
mainstream financial sector has numerous advantages including lower transaction costs, stronger 
consumer protection, and an opportunity to earn interest on accumulated funds (Caskey, this 
volume; Hogarth and Lee, this volume).  It has also been suggested that IDAs may have 
beneficial psychological effects, by shifting individuals’ focus from the “here and now” toward 
the future.   
 
The conference papers provide a first empirical look at the effect of IDAs, using data from the 
American Dream Demonstration (ADD), along with the effect of other savings opportunities on 
the behavior and decisions of low-income individuals.  These studies, along with other work, 
provide evidence that the poor respond favorably to savings opportunities.  Schreiner et al. (this 
volume) found that the average participants in the American Dream Demonstration (ADD) made 
a net monthly deposit of $24.40, which translates into around $880 per year at a match rate of 
2:1. While these figures are suggestive, they do not indicate how much would have been saved in 
the absence of the ADD program.  Stegman, Faris and Gonzalez (this volume) look at this 
question by comparing the savings behavior of individuals who have the characteristics of the 
ADD population, whether or not they are currently participating in the program.  They found that 
the ADD program induced one-half of participants to save more than they would have in the 
absence of the program, while it induced the other half to save less.2  One would expect that total 
accumulated savings, including the match, would be the same or greater for ADD participants.  
Oddly, however, they did not find this to be the case for a substantial fraction (one-third) of 
ADD participants, a finding that remains to be resolved.   
 
 Instead of focusing on savings per se, Moore et al. examined how ADD participants 
accumulated funds for deposit.  They found that participants did so by adjusting their 
consumption and work activities in a variety of ways, including shopping more carefully, eating 
out less, reducing discretionary expenditures and working more.  They also found that a non-
negligible fraction postponed doctors’ visits or delayed paying bills, which raises some cause for 
concern.   
 
                                                          
1  In addition, banking practices might be altered, including offering branch “outlets,” accounts with low minimum 
balances, fee-based check cashing, Christmas club type accounts, and deposit-secured emergency loans (Caskey, 
this volume). 
2 This latter effect is possible because the match allows participants to put less of their own money in the bank and 
still accumulate the same or a larger total amount of funds. 
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In addition to IDAs, the Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) provides a potential savings 
opportunity since virtually all recipients receive it in a lump sum. Smeeding, Ross, and 
O’Connor (2000) asked a sample of Chicago residents who anticipated a tax refund (largely the 
EITC) what their top priorities for the refund would be. Notably, they found that nearly 50 
percent of recipients planned to save at least a portion of it.  In related work, Beverly et al. (this 
volume) examined a sample of low-income individuals who were offered a chance to open a 
savings account at the same time that they received tax preparation assistance. They found that a 
number of  previously “unbanked” individuals decided to open an account when they learned 
they would receive an EITC refund, providing additional evidence that the poor respond 
favorably to savings opportunities when they are at hand. 
 
In the conference papers, with the exception of Smeeding (this volume), it is assumed that the 
asset-building policies targeted at the low-income population exist in isolation.  While this is a 
useful initial assumption, a next step in the research agenda is to examine asset-building policies 
and their effects in the broader context of programs designed to assist the low-income 
population. This is important because commitment to a new program may potentially divert 
resources from existing programs, whether private or public, especially in times of economic 
downturns.  In addition, there may be potential conflicts in policy goals.  And, policies may have 
unintended as well as intended consequences 
 
In designing programs to assist the poor, policymakers have attempted to increase incomes or 
provide in-kind transfers to meet basic needs, and sought to encourage (or at least not discourage 
too much) paid work, while trying to limit the number of individuals eligible for the programs, 
and hence costs.   However, it has not been possible to accomplish all three at the same time.  
This has been termed the “iron triangle of welfare.”  For instance, if the tax rate imposed on 
welfare benefits for each additional dollar is reduced, say from 100 to 50 percent, this has the 
benefit of encouraging work, but it also increases the number of individuals eligible for the 
program and hence program costs.  Or, if the maximum benefit is reduced, this keeps program 
costs down but many more families will be in poverty.  It is also worthwhile nothing that 
policies, with the exception of the IDA, have not been explicitly designed to encourage asset-
accumulation, and in fact, major state and federal welfare programs discourage individuals from 
doing so; eligibility rules typically require that assets, in addition to income, fall below a certain 
threshold, or they place a limit on the value of owned vehicles. 
 
The conference points to two additional policy goals: 4) move individuals from the alternative 
financial sector (“unbanked”) to the mainstream financial sector (“banked”); and 5) encourage 
savings/asset accumulation.  Not surprisingly, those with the lowest incomes also have the 
lowest asset levels (Haveman and Wolff, this volume) and are much more likely to be 
“unbanked.” (Hogarth and Lee, this volume; and Caskey, this volume).  These goals, along with 
the three stated earlier, raise additional potential policy conflicts that warrant consideration.   
 
First, there is a potential conflict between asset accumulation and poverty alleviation.  There are 
two things that one can do with income, either spend it or save it. Encouraging asset 
accumulation necessarily means that individuals must defer consumption.  While Moore et al. 
(this volume) found that IDA participants typically accumulated savings by becoming a smarter 
shopper or reducing discretionary expenditures, they also found that some participants did so by 
Center for Social Development 
Washington University in St. Louis 
2
postponing doctor and/or dentist visits (though this was significantly less likely for those with 
children).   Given the importance of preventive medicine, these latter behavioral strategies may 
potentially worsen participants’ health outcomes. They also found that some participants 
postponed paying bills, which can negatively affect their credit ratings and further reduce their 
likelihood of participating in the mainstream financial sector.  They also found that some 
individuals increased their debt, either by charging more goods on their credit cards or borrowing 
from family and friends, though these strategies were quite rare. 
 
Smeeding (this volume) raises this same issue somewhat differently.  Is the Earned Income Tax 
Credit (EITC) an income or an asset transfer?  For a single dollar, it must serve one or the other 
purpose; it cannot serve both.  For the poorest individuals and families, the EITC may function 
as an income transfer program only.  For instance, Rebecca Blank (2000) indicates that for a 
family comprised of a minimum wage worker (full-time, full-year) plus 2 to 3 children in 1998, 
the EITC just raised their income to the poverty level to cover basic needs, leaving few if any 
funds to meet long-term goals.  On other hand, for those who have higher incomes and are at the 
upper end of eligibility for the EITC, the EITC might be viewed as an asset transfer.3     
 
Second, there is a potential conflict between asset accumulation and cost containment in welfare 
programs.  As noted, IDAs and other asset accumulation “vehicles” provide incentives to save.  
In response, individuals may, for instance, spend less of their own money on food and instead 
make greater use of food stamps or local area food banks.  These actions would serve to increase 
the number of food program participants and hence the financial burden placed on these 
programs.  If IDAs are made more widely available, other costs might rise (or at least not 
decrease) as well. For instance, Schreiner et al. (this volume) point to the benefits but also the 
high cost per participant of providing close contact between IDA staff and participants in the 
ongoing demonstration projects.  It is possible that such costs could be as high in a larger-scale 
program, since efficiency gains may be difficult to realize. Also, in a larger-scale program there 
would be an increased risk of fraud and the costs associated with it because a much larger and 
perhaps more varied set of withdrawal requests would have to be reviewed. 
 
Third, there is a potential conflict between asset accumulation and encouraging paid work.  IDAs 
encourage paid work since the program matches earned income that is saved.  Indeed, Moore et 
al. (this volume) find that paid work increased among program participants. On the other hand, 
this effect may be dampened by the fact that individuals need less money than before to 
accumulate the same dollar amount of savings (see Stegman et al., this volume).  
 
In future work, I would suggest that attention be paid to the following points.  First, a tenet of 
microeconomics is that individuals respond to incentives (see, for instance, Pollak, 1998). It is 
important not only learn more about how individuals respond to asset opportunities but also to 
focus on what is given up in doing so.  Moore et al. (this volume) provide a good start at looking 
at these types of issues, though their sample size is small and their study group is restricted to 
program participants, who may be more motivated to save than the general population.  In 
addition, it is important to recognize that policies have feedback effects.  For instance, the 
                                                          
3 However, for those with higher earnings in the phase-out range of the EITC, the value of the credit is 
smaller. 
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generally low level of assets held by the low-income population, as discussed in Haveman and 
Wolff (this volume), may, in part, reflect a rational response to the availability of unemployment 
insurance and the presence of the federal/state safety net (TANF, food stamps, etc.)  That is, 
individuals might maintain lower asset levels given the very existence of these programs.  Also, 
as noted, deferred consumption may lead to greater take-up rates in the food stamp program and 
greater demands placed on area food banks.  
 
Second, it is important to keep in mind that the studies presented here consider the effects of 
asset accumulation on the behavior of individuals who have voluntarily participated in a savings 
program. Program participants are those likely to be the most motivated to save in general, or 
have a particular interest in one of the long-term goals targeted by the program (home ownership, 
post-secondary schooling or business capitalization). As various authors indicate, the behavioral 
responses they identify may not accurately reflect the behavior of any randomly chosen 
unbanked or poor individual who is given a savings opportunity.  This is not to say that looking 
at the behavior of participants is inappropriate or uninteresting, but rather that extrapolation of 
findings to the broader population must be done with care. 
 
Third, the conference papers raise some question as to the possible uses of  accumulated IDA 
funds.  IDAs, by and large, encourage three specific activities.  Though their lists differ 
somewhat, Smeeding (this volume) and Beverly et al. (this volume) point to a much wider array 
of activities that might enhance “social and economic mobility,” including purchasing a car or a 
computer, moving to a better neighborhood, paying off medical bills, or putting funds aside for 
retirement.  Many of these activities seem worthwhile as well.  Is it feasible to expand the current 
list of long-term goals that are encouraged by IDAs?  IDAs might also be expanded to allow for 
emergency withdrawals (unmatched funds only) that arise, even for those who have the best 
intention of saving toward long-term goals. This modification might also increase the take-up 
rate for IDAs, and in turn, increase the fraction of low-income individuals participating in the 
mainstream financial sector.    
 
Fourth, it would be useful to understand why the EITC is taken as a lump sum by virtually all 
recipients.  Is it because they want forced savings? Or is it because they are not aware that the 
EITC can be received in increments, or because their employers are reluctant to do so?  
Smeeding (this volume) raises this question but does not address it here.  
 
Fifth, it is important to take account of the interaction between IDAs and state and federal 
welfare program rules regarding income thresholds, asset limits, work incentives, and family 
structure incentives. Of particular interest here are rules regarding the treatment of assets. If, for 
instance, monies in IDAs are disregarded in determining eligibility for welfare programs such as 
TANF and Food Stamps, this will serve to increase the number of individuals eligible for these 
transfer programs, thereby potentially increasing their costs. 
 
In conclusion, an asset-based policy holds much promise.  A microeconomic perspective also 
indicates that much remains to be learned about its effects on incentives, possible feedback 
effects, and its interrelationship with other programs that seek to meet the needs of low-income 
individuals.            
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